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Drafi Recommendalion
on transatlantb co-operatbn on European anti-ntissik dofence
The Assembly,
O Recognising the need for Europe to determine the risks for its security of the proliferation of ballis-
tic technologies in the countries of the third world and in particular in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East;
(iil Recalling the need for the discussion already started in WEU to be taken further in order to contri-
bute to identifying these risks and their effects on Europe and for giving this discussion real impetus;
(iiil Taking into consideration the need for European countries to reach a joint position on anti-missile
defence, in order to avoid a dangerous delay in relation to the evolution ofthe threat;
(iv) Recalling its earlier conclusions on the need to envisage a system of protection which takes account
of European needs and also of work done in this area by the United States;
(v) Considering the many advsrages that co-operation in the widest sense and based on equality bet-
ween the Eansatlantic partners could obtain for the trro sides in the area of anti-missile defence;
(vi) Considering however that certain progmrnmes launched by the United States, such as TTIAAD,
have reached a very advanced stage, which precludes co-operation from the outset;
(vii) Recalling moreover that the missile technology control rEgrme provides for the signatory countries
to strengthen the principles upheld by that agreement through their respective legislations;
(viii) Taking into account the differences now separating countries that used to be members of Cocom in
identifying the countries which constitute a strategic threat to their security;
(bc) Considering that the countries which are at present establishing the bases of the new Cocom must
reach a consensus, particularly with regard to prohibition of certain transactions with given countries or
for a specific purpose;
(x) Considering that the system which is to succeed Cocom must have as its main objective to prevent
the countries constituting a true proliferation risk and a real threat to regional stability from procuring
conventional armaments and associated technology;
(xi) Judging necessary that agreements directed to this end should be concluded as quickly as possible;
(xii) Emphasising the importance for WEU to define a joint potcy for the exportation of arrraments;
(xiii) Taking account of the need to take the necessary steps as soon as possible for preparing a
conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),
Rrcornr,mNos rHAT rrg CouNcn-
1. Give the Assembly precise information about progress made in the study being conducted by the
Special Working Group on European anti-missile defence;
2. Let the Assembly know whether a meeting of experts has been held in order to prepare an analysis
of risks and, if so, what conclusions were drawn from that meeting;
3. Ask member countries to strengthen in their respective legislations the principles upheld by the
MTCR;
4. Encourage the adoption in member countries of a joint position on the definition of the countries
that constitute a strategic threat to their security;
5. Seek a consensus among member countries on the bases of the r6gime to replace Cocom;
6. Promote among member countries the intoduction in the very near future of a joint policy towards
the exportation of armaments to third countries;
7 . Speed up examination of the development of a European space-based observation system and the
taking of decisions in that respect;
8. Create a study group on a European early warning system;
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9. Discuss the possibilities of co-operation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile
defence; such co-operation should be on a basis ofequal partnership in development and production and
might cover the following areas:
(a) programmes on an endo-atrnospheric system currently under study in Europe and the United
States and which might possibly lead to joint implementation of a single prograrnme;
( b ) exo- atrrtospheric systems ;
(c) airborne systemso adapted in any event, to European Rafale and Eurofighter combat aircraft;
(d) sndy of the possibility for Europe to adopt a joint position on the possible procurement of the
American THAAD prograrnme;
10. Reach a joint position on the various possibilities described above in the interests of Europe and our
ffansatlantic allies.
1 1. Establish contacts between WEU and the BMDO for discussion of the problems already described.
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Explanatory Memarandum
(subnifred by Mn AAki.nsory Ropporteur)
I.Introduction
1. In November 1992, the Technological and
Aerospace Committee adopted the report by Mr.
Lenzer (Document 1339) on anti-ballistic missile
defence, the main aim of which, as the report sta-
ted was oo...to draw the attention of the Council
and the pubtc to a problem of a new kind that
makes it necessary for Europe to assess the risks
to its security that may arise from the increasing
proliferation of ballistics technology in third
world countries, particularly those along Europe's
southern and south-eastern flanks".
2. The conclusions ofthe above report revea-
led the need to open up an in-depth discussion
which would contribute to identifying the nature
of these risks and also to understanding their pos-
sible implications for Europe and the urgency for
our continent to reach a joint position on anti-mis-
sile defence, so as to avoid a dangerous time-lag
in relation to the development of the threat.
3. A few months later, in April 1993, the
Technological and Aerospace Committee organi-
sed a symposium in Rome on anti-missile defence
for Europe, which made a very important contri-
bution to the above debate.
4. The first conclusion to be drawn from this
symposium was the need to create a space-based
observation and early warning system, following
which an anti-missile defence system could sub-
sequently be chosen. Furthermore, the conclu-
sions stressed the need for the WEU Assembly to
formulate "recommendations regarding a protec-
tion system with due regard to European require-
ments and taking into account the work already
done by the United States. This might lead to a co-
operative system, perhaps drawing other coun-
tries into what might be a security partnership.
First, however, there would have to be risk assess-
ment and risk description. In a second stage,
WEU member countries should define their secu-
rity requirements and pool the means at their dis-
posal to find an appropriate answer to the diffe-
rent risks. In doing this it was obvious that Europe
also had to consider the American offer of partici-
pation in a global protection system. Technical
options could not replace political decisions. But
a policy could function only if it had operational
leeway and for this it needed technical and mili-
tary options. It was therefore necessary to come to
grips with reality".
5. The Council's reply to Recommendation
533 on anti-ballistic missile defence was fully
consistent with the opinion of the Assembly on
the need for assessment of the risks for Euroie of
the development of ballistic capabilities and the
proliferation of ballistics technology in countries
close to Europe's southern and south-eastern
flanks. The Council indicated, moreover, that a
global antimissile protection system (GPS) was
an item for discussion on the Special Working
Group's agenda.
6. In response to the Assembly's recommen-
dation that a European position be established on
the United States' projected global protection
against limited strikes (GPALS), the Council sta-
ted that the establishment of such a position
should necessarily be preceded by an in-depth
study of the questions relating to a global protec-
tion system.
7. The first part of the thirty-ninth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly (lst January
- 30th June 1993) states that the work of the
Special Working Group had been in large measure
devoted to the development of the American ini-
tiatives for a global protection system and to
anti-missile defence in Europe and that "discus-
sion centred on the assessment of the risks which
Europe might face and the implications for Euro-
peans of American thinking on this mafter. The
group noted with great interest the content of the
contributions made at the Assembly's seminar in
Rome on 20th and 21st April and the conclusions
of that seminar".
8. The subject continued to have priority on
the agenda of the Special Working Group as the
second part of the thiffy-ninth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly indicates. This states
that among its tasks the Special Working Group
continued to be engaged in more detailed Euro-
pean thinking on an anti-missile defence system.
9. The report also states that given the change
of direction in American government policy (after
Mr. Clinton's arrival in the White House), the
group decided to stop using the term "GPS" in its
documents and to take over the term "anti-missile
defence" used by the Assembly.
10. Finally the group agreed that WEU should
concenffate on the defence aspectso having regard
to the work carried out in other bodies on non-
proliferation, and recommended to the Council
that a meeting of experts be held to prepare a risk
4
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analysis. The resulting document would then be
submitted to the Special Working Group.
11. In this context the present report proposes
to present a series of suggestions that might
contribute to establishing transatlantic co-opera-
tion with a view to a European anti-missile defen-
ce, and would also take the fullest account of the
declaration of heads of state and of government
participating in the Norttr Atlantic Council sum-
mit meeting in Brussels on lOth and llth January
1994. Since this meeting, which recognised the
existence of a European security and defence
identity and endorsed its development, there has
been steady progress towards greater and ever
closer co-operation between NATO and WEU.
12. In drawing conclusions about the time-
liness and viability of co-operation in the above-
mentioned area, the present document will take
account of work undertaken under the missile
technology control r6gime (MTCR) and the proli-
feration of missile technology; it will analyse the
strategic defence initiative and global protection
against limited strikes and the present policy of
the United States as regards an anti-missile defen-
ce system; lastly, it will study current initiatives
by NATO and the WEU member countries in the
area of anti-ballistic missile defence.
II. Tlu missile technolagt confrol rdgime
MTCD - the proliferalion of missile tcchnologt
13. Although the committee has already made
a study of MTCR (Document 1305: Arms export
policy, 30th April 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Aarts) it
is fully relevant at this juncture to recall certain
aspects of this report and bring certain informa-
tion it contains up to date.
14. The first such aspect is that the MTCR is
not a treaty but an unofficial agreement and the
actual controls remain the national responsibility
of the individual participating counties. It is there-
fore an agreement, the implementation of whose
estabtshed rules rests solely on the good will of
the countries party to it.
15. The principles established under the agree-
ment are not intended 
- 
and this is explicitly sta-
ted 
- 
to impede national space programmes or
international co-operation in such programmes as
long as such prograrnmes do not contribute to
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
The purpose of the agreement is to limit the risks
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological) by control-
ling transfers that could contribute to supplying
technology used in the production of such weapons.
16. The agreement, initially signed in April
1987, was revised in early 1993. Although origi-
nally the agreement referred to control of techno-
logies to handle a 500 kg payload over a range of
300 km, the present text makes no reference to
either payload or range. The signatory countries,
and logically therefore, firms inside their territo-
ries, are to refrain from supplying another counbry
with any hardware or technology for use in mis-
sile manufacture, regardless of payload or range.
17. Your Rapporteur is informed that the follo-
wing countries are at present members of the mis-
sile technology control r6gime: Argentina, Aus-
tria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States; these include the seven coun-
tries that signed in 1987. Other states have decla-
red their adherence to the principles of the MTCR
or are in the process of doing so; these include
Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Indonesia,
Romania, Russia and South Africa. It should be
noted that all the member countries of the Euro-
pean Union and those that will presumably form
part of the Union from 1995 are members of the
MTCR.
18. The MTCR covers transfers of equipment
and technology relevant to missiles. In the evalua-
tion of transfer applications the following factors
will be taken into account:
(i)the prevention of proliferation of wea-
pons of mass destruction;
(ii) the capabilities and objectives of the
missile and space programmes of the
recipient state;
(iii) the significance of the transfer in terms
of the potential development of sys-
tems for producing weapons of mass
destruction;
(iv) the assessment of the end use of the
fransfers, including the assurance of the
recipient state that they will be used
only for the purpose stated, that neither
such use nor the items transferred will
be modified or duplicated without the
prior consent of the suppter govern-
ment and that neither the items nor any
replicas nor derivatives will be retrans-
ferred without the consent of the sup-
plier government.
The MTCR provides that governments should
enforce these principles through their respective
national legislations.
19. Despite the fact, noted previously, that
many countries are already pafiy to the MTCR or
have stated their intention ofjoining in future, and
despite the importance of these countries, the fact
of the matter is that this control mechanism,
which is certainly unique of its kind, is not entire-
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ly fulfilling its objectives, even though the MTCR
admittedly constitutes a major obstacle to
attempts by certain countries to acquire such
equipment and technologies.
20. According to data provided by the United
States Defence Department, the current situation
of third world countries in relation to theatre bal-
listic missiles is that shown in the following table:
In Developmenl
* Prohibitcd.
21. Moreover since the demise of Cocom (Co-
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls) at the start of 1994, differences over a
successor organisation to take over its responsibi-
lities are beginning to surface berween the former
Cocom members (Australia, Japan and NAIO
members except for Iceland), as the Americans
and Europeans are unable to reach agreement on
the aims of export controls.
22. In the first place there seem to be diffe-
rences of opinion about which countries consti-
tute sfrategic threats. This means that a wide mul-
tilateral consensus has to be achieved which takes
account of specific transactions that may not be
licensed for a given destination or particular end-
use. Moreover there is apparently as yet no agree-
ment on the list of items to be subject to confrols.
23. The new successor r6gime to Cocom will
have to be directed towards conventional arma-
ments and their related technology, and concen-
trate on those countries that represent prolifera-
tion risks and threats to regional stability 
- 
which
from the United States' point of view means
countries such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and North
Korea.
24. Adherence to the new rdgime will be open
only to countries that already belong to existing
multilateral non-proliferation 16gimes, the
MTCR, the Ausffalian Group (biological and che-
mical weapons) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and which additionally subscribe to armaments
control standards such as the START agreements.
25. It therefore seems obvious and necessary
for the partners on either side of the Atlantic to
reach specific agreements as soon as possible,
making an effective contribution to controlling
real and potential threats that will inevitably be
amplified if there is no suitable joint response on
our part.
26. The United States is currently opposed to
Russia and other countries of the former Soviet
Union being founder members of any new succes-
sor organisation to Cocom, because, according to
Washington, these countries continue to supply
armaments to hostile countries (mainly Russia
which supplies Iran), basically on account of their
desperate need for cash. During his recent visit to
Washington in late September 1994, President
Yeltsin gave an undertaking to end Russian arms
sales once outstanding contracts (some dating
from 1988) were fulfilled.
27. The most recent and obvious example of
such a threat has been North Korea, a country
which has pushed itself far beyond its true econo-
mic capacity in order to acquire a nuclear capabi-
lity together with ballistic missiles such as the
Taepodong I and 2 
- 
the latter, with a possible
range of over 3 000 km, reported to be available
quite soon (and consequently available for export).
28. The European Union for its part is prepa-
ring to draw up regulations for armaments
exports. It is seeking to establish a community
system for armaments exports to third countries.
Your Rapporteur has learnt that work is being
done on product liss on which products are to be
counted as dual-use and the rdgime that should
govern them. The legal principles which are to
apply have yet to be clarified.
29. From the aboveo it is quite clear that export
controls are not an entirely effective solution for
avoiding ballistic missile proliferation. The
MTCR and the new Cocom will be useful tools,
provided there is no hesitation about their being
interpreted more rigorously and an attempt is
made to win the support of the largest number of
countries possible for their principles.
250 km
to
600 km
Afghanistan (Scud-B)
China (M-11, M-9)
DPRK (Scud-B, Scud C)
Egypt (Scud-B)
India (Prithvi)
Iran (Scud-B, Scud-C)
*Iraq (Scud-B, Al-Hussein)
Israel (Jericho-l)
Libya (Scud-B)
Pakistan (11afr-2, M- I 1, Hatf-3)
Syria (Scud-B, Scud-C, M-9)
Yemen (Scud-B)
> 600 km
*Iraq (AI-Abbas)
Ihiwan (TienMa)
1 000 km
to
I 500 km
DPRK (No Dong-l)
Israel (Jericho-2)
South Africa (Arniston)
2 000 km
to
5 000 km
China (CSS-2, CSS-S,
JL-l SLBM)
DPRK (Ihepodong-1,
Ihepodong-2)
India (Aeri)
*Iraq (Tammuz-l)
Saudi Arabia (CSS-2)
>5000km China (CSS-3, CSS-4)
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30. [n short, the range of measures for avoiding
the risk of proliferation, or at least reducing it as
far as possible must be directed primarily towards
prevention, with the assistance o^f political and
economic measures, measures for preventing
technology transfer (MTCR, new Cocom ...), pre-
ventive military action and also deterrence mea-
sures implying the threat of reprisals and protec-
tion including active and passive defence.
31. All of the foregoing must be accompanied
by confidence-building and regional security
measures, as this committee has observed already
in the report referred to earlier (Document 1305)
at least as far as Asia is concerned and, to a far les-
ser degree, South America. In the Mediterranean
and the Near and Middle East, the situation is far
more problematic and complex and the idea refer-
red to elsewhere of a CSCM (or Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean)
could be helpful in contextualising the problem as
part of the process of analysis and search for a
solution.
III. United States policy
on missile defence systems
32. On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan
announced the strategic defence initiative (SDI), a
long-term technology research programme
consistent with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile(ABM) treaty, to examine the feasibility of deve-
loping defences against ballistic missile attacks
and to attempt to create a space shield which
would render nuclear weapons "impotent and
obsolete". The SDI was devised as an alternative
to the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doc-
trine which, for several decades, had based deter-
rence on the threat of massive retaliation and sub-
sequent destruction of United States and Soviet
societies. The mission of SDI was to redefine
deterrence by giving the United States (and its
allies) the means to protect people and military
assets from Soviet attacks.
33. The Reagan adminisftation established the
SDI programme in January 1984 and in April
1984 the Strategic Defence Initiative Organisa-
tion (SDIO) was chartered to manage the efforts
of the Department of Defence (DoD). The admi-
nistration's first SDI budget submission to
Congress requested $2 billion for FY1985 and
Congress authorised a total of $1.621 billion. By
1985, SDI had become the Department of Defen-
ce's largest single research and development pro-
gamme.
34. In January 1985, a White House paper
acknowledged that, while the ultimate objective
was still a defensive system which would protect
the population of the United States directly, the
more immediate goal was to make nuclear retalia-
tion more effective. Under this rationale, SDI
would help deter a nuclear attack by complicating
Soviet planners' efforts to destroy American
nuclear forces in a frst sffike. Together with air
defences, effective defences against ballistic mis-
siles would substantially lower the possibility of
nuclear war.
35. Much of the technology needed for SDI
was already under way before 1983, which allow-
ed the programme to move quickly to a high fun-
ding level. The army already had a substantial
ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology pro-
gramme moving forward in surveillance and
ftacking, interceptor missiles and terminal battle
management. The air force and the Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
had several technology development programmes
under way in directed energy weapons (DEW)
and space surveillance. At least 25 Departrnent of
Defence programmes were aggregated and
restuctured to form the SDI programme.
36. A breakthrough in BMD technology occur-
red in June 1984 when Lockheed's homing over-
lay experiment (HOE) successfully intercepted
and destroyed a mock ballistic missile warhead in
the midcourse phase of its flight. This non-nuclear
intercept was the flrst such experiment demons-
trating the homing guidance system and the
potential of kinetic energy weapons (KEW) to
destroy ballistic missiles and their warheads by
colliding with them at great speeds. HOE, mana-
ged by the army's ballistic missile defence sys-
tems command, represented a decade of research
and development, data-processing and optical
technology. This experiment laid the foundation
for the exo-atmospheric re-enrry vehicle intercep-
tor system (ERIS), a technology researched under
the SDI prograrnme.
37. Other key experiments included:
- 
in September 1985, a ground-based direc-
ted energy experiment using the mid-
ffiared advanced chemical laser (MIRA-
CL) device conducted at the White Sands
missile range: the target, a Titan booster
rigged to simulate a thrusting booster, was
successfully destroyed by the laser. SDIO
also conducted the first successful
demonstration of the ability to track a
sounding rocket in space with a low-
power, ground-based laser after adjusting
the beam for affnospheric distortion;
- 
in April-June 1986, a series of flexible
lightweight agile guided experiments(FLAGE): these kinetic energy experi-
ments demonstrated the guidance techno-
logies necessary to intercept a warhead
both in and beyond the earth's afrnosphere;
-in July 1986, SDI's first particle beam
experiment irradiated a miniature re-
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entry vehicle with a high-intensity proton
beam, demonstrating that the explosive
contained in the re-entry vehicle was
highly vulnerable to the particle beam.
38. In 1987, the Heritage Foundation published
a study arguing that the SDI programme was still
too vaguely defined. The paper proposed an archi-
tecture for the SDI consisting of a three-tier sys-
tem with space- and land-based components
capable of destroying ICBMs at various stages in
their flight. This near-term, kinetic-kill, layered
strategic defence system would cost approximate-
ly $1OO to $121 and would include:
- 
space-based kinetic-kill vehicles targeted
at the incoming missile's boost phase and
post-boost phase;
- 
a ground-based component, similar to
Lockheed's exo-atmospheric re-entry
interceptor system (ERIS), to shoot down
missiles in the mid-course of their fajec-
tories;
- 
a tenninal defence, similar to McDonnell
Douglas's high endo-atmospheric inter-
ceptor (HED[), to desftoy those few mis-
siles which get through the other two
layers;
-radar sensors of different types for each
of the three layers, to track and target
ICBMs;
- 
battle management and commando
control and communications (BM/C3)
capabilities to guide and manage the
overall system.
39. The study recognised DEW (lasers and par-
ticle beams) as having the potential to fulfil SDI's
mission but it pointed out that those technologies
would require ten to fifteen years of research and
development before deployment.
40. The SDI prograrnme was given a structure
and a strategy. The goal of the programme was
reduced to "near-term deployment of limited bal-
listic missile defences as a hedge against Soviet
breakout of the ABM treaty" (SDIO report to
Congress on the SDI, April 1988). The "Paul
Nitze criteria" of military effectiveness, surviva-
bility and cost-effectiveness at the margin was
inroduced as a prerequisite to deployment. The
adminisradon defined and adopted a specific SDI
deployment concept for the 1990s and beyond,
referred to as "phased development". The strate-
gic defence system (SDS) envisaged by the
Departrnent of Defence would be the culmination
of several different SDI deployment phases
consisting of ever-evolving SDI technologies.
41. Phase one of the SDS consisted of space-
based kinetic energy interceptors to attack ballis-
tic missiles and warheads in the boost and post-
boost phases. For that purpose, various sensors
would be used during the various phases of flight,
as recommended by the Heritage Foundation
study:
- 
a sensor system concept called boost sur-
veillance and tracking system (BSTS)
would be used to track missiles in the
boost phase;
- 
for intercept during the post-boost and
mid-course phase outside the atmosphe-
reo two other sensor system concepts
would be required: (l) a space surveillan-
ce and racking system (SSTS) 
- 
an orbi-
ting satellite sensor; and (ii) a ground-
based surveillance and tracking system
(GSTS) 
- 
a system that launches sensors
into space by rocket booster after war-
ning of an attack from the BSTS;
- 
a ground-based radar (GBR) would pro-
vide a late mid-course and terminal phase
sensor system to track and discriminate
re-entry objects that have survived the
defences in the boost, post-boost and
mid-course phases.
42. An exo-afinospheric re-entry vehicle inter-
ceptor system (ERIS) would be used on the
ground to complement the space-based intercep-
tor (SBI). The SBI concept was eventually super-
seded by a smaller, low-cost, mass-produced,
individually-deployed space-based interceptor
called Brilliant Pebble. A constellation of these
smaller interceptors would be deployed in space,
revolutionising the SDI architecture (see Appen-
dix D.Reportedly, the phase one system was sup-
posed to take oat5OTo of the Soviet SS-18s laun-
ched and about 3OVo of the total attack.
Deployment of this system would have to be done
in sub-phases due to budget and technology
consffaints.
43. Fo1low-on system concepts, to be used in
phases two and three of the SDS included:
- 
space-based neutral particle beam (NPB)
weapons;
- 
a high endo-atmospheric defence inter-
ceptor (HEDI);
- 
an airborne optical system (AOS);
- 
a ground-based radar (GBR);
- 
a space-based laser (SBL);
-a ground-based hypervelocity gun(HVG); and
- 
a ground-based laser (GBL).
(see Appendix tr).
M. As early as March 1985, the administation
emphasised that the SDI programme was desi-
gned to enhance allied seculity as well as United
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States security and sollicited allied participation.
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and Norway
declared that they would not participate in the
SDI. However, their private industry could
conffact directly for SDI work. Other countries
signed agreements regarding government and
industrial participation in the SDI: the United
Kingdom signed a memorandum of understan-
ding (MOU) with the United States on 6th
December 1985, followed by West Germany in
March 1986, Israel in May 1986,Italy in Septem-
ber 1986 and Japan in July 1987. The Netherlands
signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in
July 1987. At the beginning of 1988, eighty
conftacts had been awarded to foreign companies
for a total ot$127 .2 million (not including foreign
subconffactors).
45. The SDI played a significant r6le in the
United States-Soviet anns conffol negotiations: it
prompted the USSR to reopen the STARI trlks.
From 1985 onwards, the United States and the
Soviet Union held several rounds in Geneva to
negotiate a strategic arms reduction treaty
(START I) aimed at reducing each side's nuclear
warheads by half. Between 1985 and 1991, Uni-
ted States and Soviet differences over the SDI
prograrnme caused an impasse in the START
negotiations, but SDI was one of the key factors
which led the Soviets to begin serious discussions
on arms reduction and eventually to sign the
START treaty in July 1991. The SDI also played a
significant r6le in the intermediate nuclear forces(INF) negotiations leading to the signing of the
INF fteaty in December 1987. The adminisftation
consistently argued that a major objective of the
SDI programme was to provide anns control leve-
rage over the soviet Union.
46. At the beginning of 1990, responding to
changes in the international and domestic climate,
the SDIO began redefining its plans for the deve-
lopment of strategic and theaffe defences. Former
United States defence and space talks chief nego-
tiator Henry Cooper was hired by Defence Secre-
tary Dick Cheney to review the SDI prograrnme
and recommend how it could be revised to meet
the changing international scenario and the new
threats, i.e., the decreasing threat of a massive
Soviet nuclear attack and the increasing threat of a
third world attack.
47. Mr. Cooper developed a plan called global
protection against limited strikes (GPALS). The
goal of GPALS was to protect the United States
completely from an unauthorised, accidental or
third world nuclear attack of up to 200 warheads
or re-entry vehicles. The plan also envisaged the
improvement and co-ordination of theatre
defences with the United States sftategic defence
and emphasised global protection in addition to
deterrence. In July 1990, Henry Cooper became
SDIO's director to carry out his plan and, in
January 1991, President Bush endorsed the
change to GPALS.
48. The GPALS anti-missile system concept
consisted of three distinct defensive spheres:
(i)theate missile defence (TMD), com-
posed of stand-alone defences against
theatre/tactical ballistic missiles;
(ii) national missile defence (NMD), pro-
viding national coverage to the United
States including Alaska and Hawaii, in
about six United States deployment
areas, and involving space and mobile
ground-based sensors as well as about
750 ground-based interceptors (GBIs)-
about half the number required to meet
SDI's phase one objectives;
(iii) global missile defence (GMD) ele-
ments, i.e., the space-based intercep-
tors that would assist the two ground-
based systems. This element would be
a constellation of about 1000 kinetic-kill vehicles known as Brilliant
Pebbles.
49. About 50 space-based sensors would prov-
ide early warning, cueing, some discrimination,
and kill assessment to both the theatre and the
United States system. The two ground systems
would also have GBRs to measure object slow-
down as it hit the atmosphere to help distinguish
light and heavy objects. The system realigned the
GSTS (a ground-based infrared sensor probe that
can be launched on demand in case of attack) as a
technical back-up to both Brilliant Eyes and
GBRs.
50. The first step in the three-tier GPALS plan
was the development of theatre defences because
theatre defence technologies were more mature
than those needed for a United States or global
defence, and also because theatre forces in a chan-
ging international scenario faced a more imme-
diate threat from ballistic missiles than the United
States homeland. The initial plan envisaged an
improved theatre defence deployed in the mid-
1990s and the United States and global systems in
place by the end of the century. SDIO emphasised
that the elements of the GPALS system "could be
deployed sequentially, and need not await the
development of an entire system. Nor would the
deployment of [the] system be contingent on the
technical maturity of follow-on systems", as was
the case with phase one of SDI. However, SDIO
promised that research on follow-on technologies
would continue to be funded. While still relying
on space assets for surveillance and communica-
tion, GPALS represented a shift away from a
space-based shield to a ground-based defence.
51. ln 1991, members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee (led by Sam Nunn and John
DOCUMENT 1435
Warner) started crafting a compromise which
would push theatre and ground-based ABM ftea-
ty-compliant United States defences to deploy-
ment while providing research funds for Brilliant
Pebbles. The result was the Missile Defence Act
of 1991, which for the frst time put Congress on
record as supporting deployment of a United
States missile defence (see Appendix tr). The act
endorsed the concept of a limited defence desi-
gned to protect the United States against limited
ballistic-missile threats. One of the key provisions
was a mandate to develop NMD by 1996 or as
soon as the technology would be ready. The single
United States defensive site was to contain 100
GBIs and to be fully compliant with the ABM
treaty. The act also called for robust funding for
Brilliant Pebbles and other follow-on technolo-
gies. However, in April 1992, Mr. Nunn conten-
ded that the SDIO was spending too much on its
plan for space-based assets (Brilliant Pebbles and
Eyes) at the expense of the ground-based systems
that Congress wanted. The FY 1993 Departrnent
of Defence authorisation revised the Missile
Defence Act by dropping the 1996 target deploy-
ment date and reiterating that the goal of the Uni-
ted States was to abide by the ABM ffeaty. While
the Senate Armed Services Committee urged the
adminisradon to "pursue vigorous changes" to
the ABM treaty, it directed SDIO "to plan the
architecture for the initial, treaty-compliant ABM
site on the basis of the reary as now constituted
and not as it may be revised". The new target date
for deployment was postponed to 2OO2.In April
1992,Mr. Cooper estimated the cost of GPALS at
about $35 billion for 5 to 7 sites, Brilliant Eyes
and BIWC3.
52. With the election of Bill Clinton as Presi-
dent, United States policy on missile defence sys-
tems shifted significantly away from the strategic
emphasis of previous Republican adminisffations.
Shrinking defence budgets, the lessons drawn
from the GuH war, major changes on the interna-
tional scene and a new political orientation all
contributed to placing the pursuit of effective
TMD on top of the priority list. The Clinton admi-
nisftation put GPALS on hold in favour of TMD
- 
involving the protection of a smaller area
against tactical ballistic missiles (as opposed to
ICBMs) 
- 
while relying more on the non-prolife-
ration treaty (NPT) and on the strengthening of
the MTCR to discourage the proliferation of bal-
listic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
The main task of theatre ballistic missile defences
was to protect expeditionary forces deployed by
the United States and its allies.
53. In early 1993, the Secretary of Defence
restructured the SDIO and renamed it the Ballistic
Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO). The
BMD programme was restructured to respond to
the "here and now" theafte ballistic-missile threat
and to an uncertain, but evolving, threat to the
United States. It was founded upon the President's
endorsement of the 1993 Deparhent of Defence
bottom-up review (BUR) and on the Missile
Defence Act (MDA) of 1991 as subsequently
amended in FY1993 and 1994 national defence
authorisation legislation. As amended, the MDA
directed the administration to 'omaintain the
option to deploy an ABM system capable of pro-
viding a highly-effective defence of the United
States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles
and to provide highly-effective theatre missile
defences to forward deployed and expeditionary
elements of the arrred forces of the United States
and as appropriate to friends and allies". The
BUR, in its assessment of the ballistic missile
threato pointed out that both deliberate or acciden-
tal launches from China or the former Soviet
Union (FS[I) were highly unlikely. As for poten-
tially hostile third world nations, the possibility of
a limited, long-range ballistic missile threat some
time in the fust decade of the next century could
not be excluded. The BUR also identified a new,
more urgent threat: the proliferation of shorter-
range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biolo-
gical, or chemical warheads. It stated that, 'oin
recognition of the low probability of a long-range
ballistic missile attack from the FSU or China, but
to preserve a hedge against acquisition or indige-
nous development of a long-range ballistic missi-
le capability by another potentially hostile nation,
national missile defence (NMD) efforts were desi-
gnated as a second priority relative to TMD''.
54. The overall TMD programme objectives of
the Clinton administration were to field a TMD
capability rapidly by upgrading existing systems
and developing more advanced systems for acqui-
sition later in this decade. The proposed budget to
support those goals was $12 billion for FY1995-
1999. The BMDO requested a budget of $3 250
million for FY1995, including $1 770 million for
TMD research and development and $270 million
for TMD procurement efforts. An array of service
prograflrmes reinforced the joint and combined
nature of the TMD mission. The TMD initiative
(TMDD involved the army, navy and air force and
included several core prograrnmes:
- 
Patriot advanced capability level-3 (PAC-
3), an upgrade of the PAC-Z which was
used against the modified Iraqi Scud mis-
siles during the Gulf war. PAC-3 would
provide greater lethality, range and accu-
racy, and more effective capability
against tactical ballistic missiles. The frst
PAC-3 systems should be fielded by
FY1998;
- 
navy lower-tier TMD (Aegis/Standard
Missile-2 Block M). The navy and
BMDO have been co-operatively wor-
king to develop an enhancement to the
Aegis/SM air defence system which
10
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would provide a sea-based tactical ballis-
tic missile defence capability (similar to
that provided by the PAC-3);
-theatre high altitude area defence(THAAD). As the most critical element
in the "coreoo, TTIAAD represents the frst
TMD system which has been designed to
match fully the existing ballistic missile
threat. The THAAD system would allow
multiple shot opportunities to intercept
longer-range and more capable theatre
ballistic-missile threats. It has been deve-
loped for endo-atmospheric and exo-
atmospheric defence and consists of
interceptor missiles, launchers, BIWC3I
units, and a theatre missile defence
ground-based radar (TMD-GBR). It
would provide approximately twenty
times the capability of existing air defen-
ce assets, employing the latest hit-to-kill
technology. The Department of Defence
would like to give THAAD the capability
to intercept short-range or tactical mis-
siles with a range of up to 3 500 km ra-
velling at up to 5 km/second 
- 
only
slightly less than the speed of a strategic
vehicle (6 to 7 km/second). It would ope-
rate as an autonomous weapon system,
but it is required to be interoperable with
lower-tier defences. THAAD thus repre-
sents the centrepiece of a two-tiered
defence system. $495.69 million were
requested in FY1995 for the THAAD
prograrnme and deployment of the objec-
tive THAAD system was planned for
FY2O02. However, a prototypical
THAAD battery as a user-operational
evaluation system (UOES) should be
developed at the end of the demonstra-
tion/validation phase in 1996 for early
operational assessment and possible
deployment should a contingency arise.
Provision of the UOES has been a major
thrust and priority of the TMD program-
me.
55. The abovementioned two-tiered defence
system would rely on a theatre missile defence
ground-based radar (TMD-GBR) as well as on a
command and control centre. The TMD-GBR
would provide surveillance and fre control sup-
port for the THAAD missile system and cueing
support to lower-tier systems such as Patriot. It
would utilise state-of-the-art radar technology in
order to provide a capability to perform threat
classification against theatre tactical ballistic mis-
siles and kill assessment after intercept. As for
battle management and command, control and
communication capabilities, BMDO has taken the
lead to establish an architecture upon which all
the services can build and to ensure an effective
and joint BM/C3I. The National Test Facility
(NTD at Falcon AFB, Colorado, centrepiece of
the National Test Bed OITB), is the only facility
under direct control of the BMDO and seeks to
provide the comprehensive capability to compare,
evaluate and test alternative SDS key technolo-
gies (such as BIWC3) in a system-level context.
The NTB network of research facilities currently
has sixteen remote nodes linked together and
located throughout the United States.
56. Additional TMD efforts will involve
concept exploration activities for a potential sea-
based upper-tier wide area defence system. Sea-
based upper-tier technologies include the light-
weight exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP). The
LEAP-equipped SM-2 would follow the above-
mentioned Block IVA. By the end of 1994, the
BMDO will conduct the first at-sea exo-atmos-
pheric experimental intercepts, designated FTV-3
and FTV-4. Other TMD efforts include defence
for manoeuvring ground forces (corps SAM, a
new mobile air and missile defence system), and a
boost phase interceptor system (airborne boost
phase intercept) which would offer the potential
to destroy attacking missiles over enemy territory
and would be effective particularly against advan-
ced delivery system countermeasures. It is worth
noting that these three programmes are competing
for funds since the TMD prograrnme will only
fund a single new system (starting FY1998).
57. The new TMD prograrnme as a whole has
incorporated some technologies and components
derived from the SDI programme but, for the most
part, space-based elements have been shelved or
put on hold. In August 1994, an agreement on
how to structure a demonsftator programme for an
endo-atmospheric missile interceptor to destroy
ballistic targets in the boost phase was reached by
the air force, the BMDO and the Offrce of the
Secretary of Defence (OSD). Despite possible
funding difficulties, Defence Secretary John
Deutch approved the plan which relies heavily on
existing technologies. The United States air force
and the BMDO emphasised that the boost phase
interceptor (BPI) would supplement other por-
tions of a layered ballistic missile defence such as
Patriot or THAAD.
58. In August, the Senate Appropriation Com-
mittee chopped BMDO's budget to $2.5 billion
and changed prograrnme elements: Patriot and the
extended range interceptor (ERINT) risk reduc-
tion programme obtained more money than
requested; THAAD lost money for some flight
tests; sea-based area theatre ballistic missile
defence also suffered a reduction; TMD-GBR
funds were increased to make sure that good radar
systems are available to support THAAD; and
finally, BIWC'I funds were held to FYtgg4levels.
As far as NMD is concerned, the committee
consolidated all national missile defence techno-
logy readiness programmes in a single new pro-
11
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granrme element and funding was reduced. Fun-
ding for follow-on TMD technologies was also
reduced compared to the administration's request.
The Senate panel transferred $120 million in
Brilliant Eyes funding to the air force and eamur-
ked $50 million for a high-energy laser research
progftrrnme outside of BMDO. The panel decla-
red that early deployment of Brilliant Eyes in the
next five years coupled with no NMD technology
demonstrations would not be consistent with the
BUR. It also recommended that BMDO continue
developing and testing more mature technologies,
such as ERIS and LEAP, rather than concenfrating
on miniaturising interceptors and kill vehicles.
This represents a direct attack on Brilliant Pebbles
and a clear indication that United States ballistic
missile defence will increasingly emphasise
ground-based systems to the detriment of space-
based concepts.
IV Anti-missile defence 
- 
archilectu.re
and systems
59. After more than twenty years of technical
investigation of this area, more particularly in the
United States but in Europe too, the nature of the
specific systems required or needing to be develo-
ped has become clear in recent years, together
with their effectiveness and relative interest, allo-
wing a distinction to be drawn between what is
feasible now and areas for research.
60. The table given in Chapter II shows two
types of threat: the first is the threat of a theatre
attack from missiles with a range of under 1 000
km, calculated statistically as between 300 and
600 km. The other is a strategic threat from mis-
siles with a much greater range.
61. Theatre missiles are normally fired from
mobile launchers. The target area of these mis-
siles is necessarily more restricted if merely for
reasons of their range. Srategic missiles, if not
launched from submarineso as is the case for Rus-
sia, are fued from fixed silos, usually located well
within the borders of the enemy country.
62. Tlvo different defence systems to counter
two types of threats can be envisaged on the basis
of the following systems:
(il Endo-aftnospheric systems, mainly:
- 
American systems: Patriot, the PAC-
3 version of which is currently being
developed from the Erint missile and
Corps SAM currently in the study
phase;
-European systems: the German
TLVS, in its study phase, and the
Franco-Italian SAMPIT, also under
study, based on the anti-aircraft
SAMP/T combining the Aster missile
with either Empar or Arabel radar
systems for naval and earttr applica-
tions respectively;
-Russian systems: SA-10 and SA-11
which have been operational for
some years.
63. Endo-atmospheric systems protect the
nerve centres of the armed forces: headquarters,
communication centres and military bases and
surrounding areas of from 5 to 15 kilometres.
These systems are designed to counter theatre
missiles of up to a 1 000 km range and their effec-
tiveness is very weak against missiles in the
2 000 km range. The Russian SA-12 is effective
against missiles with a 3 000lan range.
64. These systems are mobile and generally
have a dual anti-missile and anti-aircraft function.
(ll) Endo-exo-atmospheric systems: the
only current project is the American
THAAD programme in its develop-
mentphase. THAAD (theatre high alti-
tude area defence) with its ground-
based radar, is heavy but transportable
nevertheless. It protects an area of 100-
200 km in diameter against missiles in
the 300-3 000 km range.
(iii) Exo-atmospheric systems: at present
these systems exist only in the study
phase or as prototypes. They are based
on the LEAP (light exo-atmospheric
projectile) concept, which, with a velo-
city of the order of 4 km per secondo
can defend an area 2 000 in diameter
against missiles with a I 000 km plus
range, in other words shategic and no
longer theatre missiles.
65. In general the systems under study here are
sea-based using for example the SM-2 missile
equipped with Aegis fue control. These systems
can be based on land but are difficult to transport.
66. Three or four systems based in the Mediter-
ranean would be sufEcient to protect the greater
part of Europe against threats from the south and
south-east. Nevertheless, to be fully effective,
these systems require enorrnously powerfrrl radar
systems which must have fixed locations. The
ranges of the ship-based Spy radar systems equip-
ped with Aegis are far less effective.
(iv) Boosted interceptor systems: these sys-
tems, unlike thoge preceding, are air-
borne on Eurofighter or Rafale aircraft
and require very little infrastructure.
Each aircraft in flight can block an
enemy missile in its initial launch
phase if the missile is fued at a distan-
ce of a few hundred kilometres or so
from the plane. These scenarios are
theate scenarios where the dimensions
t2
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of the firing areas are between 200 and
400 km and are within firing range of
their target (600-800 km maximum).
67. Antimissile missiles are relatively light and
allow the plane to undertake other defence mis-
sions at the same time. Moreover, they can be
used against strategic missiles, provided they are
within range of the fuing point, which is possible
if at the same time there is a declared in-theatre
crisis involving the enemy coun[ry.
(v)Ear:ly warning systems: All the systems
studied above operate satisfactorily
provided one has access to early war-
ning systems. The only existing sys-
tems are Russian and American (DSP)
but these only operate with strategic or
long-range theatre missiles. Projects
are being studied in Europe and in the
United States for warning systems that
are effective against all missiles, inclu-
ding theatre ballistic missiles (Esat in
Europe, Alarm in the United States).
These are all space-based systems and
are of varying complexity depending on
the size of the area under observation.
68. One or two geostationary satellites are
enough for continuous observation of a sensitive
launcharaof2Om kn x 20@ km.Thezoneto
be observed can be determined from earth and
changed in a few hours over one third of the earth's
surface observed from an altitude of 36 000 km.
69. This early warning system may include
purposes other than active anti-missile defence.
In particular it permits surveillance of countries
guilty of proliferation by identifying the nature of
their fire: tests or fire against other countries,
including when Europe is not involved. The sys-
tem can also determine the type of missile used.
70. It is thus possible to detect launch areas to
an accuracy of 1-5 km depending on the a priori
information available about the missile launched;
it is therefore possible to confirrn that one counfiry
rather than another has launched a missile and to
strengthen the deterrent attitudes European coun-
ries might possibly adopt.
7t. Identification of the launch area also allows
operational units to take action against batteries or
to destroy launch systems by means of conventio-
nal bombers or laser or cruise missiles.
72. The early warning system also allows the
target areas and the approximate anival time to be
identified, thus triggering the necessary warning
systems and all possible passive defence measures.
73. Thanks to these different systems Europe
can build one or several defence architectures:
- 
a theatre defence architecture could be
established with a minimum number of
endo-atmospheric systems over each
potential flash-point, preferably associa-
ted with an early warning system. To
these might be added airborne systems(with which some aircraft are equipped)
and three or four THAAD units, depen-
ding on theatre size;
-a defence architecture protecting Europe
might be made up of THAAD systems
defending major cenfres and towns with
three or four sea-based exo-atmospheric
systems and an early warning system
with three fixed ultra long-range radar
systems. Airborne systems may also be
used in the event of initial in-theatre
engagements.
V Present-day co-operatian on theatre missile
d.efence QMD)
74. In line with the report to Congress on the
plan to co-ordinate development and implementa-
tion of theatre missile defence progtammes with
allies, the United States Departrnent of Defence
has established a series of priorities for the ballis-
tic missile defence (BMD) programme. The
highest of these involves the development and
deployment of TMD systems to meet growing
threats from ballistic missiles directed towards
United States troops, allies and friends. Accor-
ding to the Department of Defence, the United
States is seeking to co-operate in developing its
anti-missile defence programme in development
and deployment of theatre defences with allies
who share the problems arising from proliferation
of ballistic missiles.
75. The Department of Defence approached
international participation in the development and
deployment of TMD systems by building on bila-
teral research and development programmes,
which aimed to encourage sharing of advanced
technologies and, at the same "me, achieve a bet-
ter understanding of political and military factors
capable of influencing.the defence architecture in
various regions around the globe. Moreover, such
participation provided America's allies and
friends with further knowledge enabling them to
make their own decisions on the basis of their
anti-missile defence requirements.
76. The result of this co-operation over research
and development progralnmes has been wider
agreement on the likelihood and impact of the use
of missiles in theatre conflict and on the need for
an effective response to the threat. This latter
point was brought home forcibly by the Gulf
conflict. Indeed, the interest in theatre anti-
missile defence dates principally from that time.
This interest has been shown in unilateral and
multilateral actions, principally through the thin-
1.3
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king developed or now being developed by NATO
and by WEU.
77. Israel and Japan, countries facing immedi-
ate threat, might be regarded as cases in point.
lsrael, in co-operation with the United States, has
developed a BMD programme based on the
Arrow missile and has prompted Japan, for its
part, to enter into bilateral discussions with the
United States on anti-missile defence, basically in
the light of the threat from North Korea.
78. In the following pages, consideration will
be given to the activities of various European
countries in relation to BMD. Also, in NATO, a
group of member states (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Nonvay, the United
Kingdom and the United States) has established
an ad-hoc working group under the Conference of
National Armaments Directors, exclusively to try
and find ways of co-operating in TMD pro-
grarnmes. Additionally, NAIO has alread made
several studies on BMD.
79. The Department of Defence wishes to capi-
talise on all of this interest through all possible
modalities of co-operation through an approach
tailored to varying circumstances, taking account
of national programmes and plans and the capabi-
lities of each nation.
80. lnter alia, the following possible actions
have been identified:
- 
sharing early-warning formulae;
- 
continued bilateral and multilateral co-
operation on research and development;
- 
improving present anti-missile defence
capabilities;
- 
sffengthening participation in joint deve-
lopment and joint production pro-
grammes;
- 
subsequent deployment of advanced
capabilities.
81. All of the above should lead to increased
regional security, cost reduction, an improvement
in security relations and greater operational inter-
operability with regard to national defence procu-
rement and deployment plans.
82. The Department of Defence's TMD pro-
gramme is based on an evolutionary development
of anti-missile defence capabilities. This would
imply improving Patriot capabilities by deploying
the PAC-3 and adding the standard missile Block
fVA on to present Aegis capabilities to provide a
sea-based lower tier defence against short-range
theatre ballistic missiles.
83. The talks that the Department of Defence is
engaged in with countries that operate with Ame-
rican export equipment, produce American sys-
tems under licence or are simply considering joint
development or future equipment purchase are
based on this same srategy.
84. The Department of Defence's plan to co-
ordinate the development and commissioning of
TMD programmes shown in the following table
seeks to avoid duplication, reduce cost and
increase interoperability.
TasLE 1
Approorh tor allitd partbipaian
Time Activity
"Build upon/improve
existing capabilities"
Incremental enhancement
Interoperability
"Qualitative new capability"
"Defence-in-depth"
Now
+
Near Term
I
I
I
Longer Term
Identify and consolidate current studies, plans,
programmes
Pursue improved early warning and tracking
capability
Pursue improved communication/data trans-
mlsslon
lmprove/develop lower tier defences
Expand/improve lower tier defences
Develop/deploy area defense capability
85. This plan is based on the defence needs
worked out by the political and military authori-
ties. The co-ordination process ensures that TMD
is integrated into the existing air defence and air
space command/connol systems. The plan takes
account of the analyses by NATO's Advisory
Group on Aerospace Research and Development(AGARD) and the BMDO-supported missile
defence architecture studies forEurope, the Middle
East and Japan, along with other reports such as
those prepared by the NATO Industrial Advisory
Group (NIAG).
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86. The short- and medium-term prograrnme
identifies the potential for immediate low-cost,
low-development, feasible improvements to exis-
ting systems and/or operational concepts that will
result in measurable improvement to early-war-
ning and TMD capabitities. The following table
shows those countries (allies and friendsbf tne
United States) with one or more existing systems
able to provide an infrastructure for an advanced
TMD capability.
Tesre2
Friends and allips: existing TMD-related capahilities
Nation TPS-59 Hawk Patriot AWACS Aegrs
FPS-117
BelEium )ooooo< )ooooo<
Canada x)o(X)o<
I)enmark )o<x)ocx
France xrooo< rcoooo<
Germanv )oax)o<x rcooocx )ooooo<
Greece )ooooo<
Iceland )oooo<x
Italy. )ooooo< )ooooo<
I-uxemhours
Netherlands. )ooooo< xrcooo<
Norway. )ooooo<
Porhrsal f2OOOO(
Soain >ooooo<
Turkey. )ooooo<
United Kingdom. >ooooo< poooo<
United States. . x)o<xxx )oooarx >oooo(x )ooooo< XX)OO<X
Sweden )o<xxxx
NATO noo(xx
Egvpt.. )ooo<xx )ooooo(
Israel )oooocx )Oaf/O<X
Jordan xx>oo<x
Krrwait >ooooo< xx)ooo< Contract
Saudi Arabia. )OOOC2O< )ooooo< )oooo<x )oooo<x
UAE . XX)OOO<
Janan >OC/OOO< xpoocx rcoooo< )OOOa2O<
Sinsanore xx)ooo<
South Korea . X)oooo< )o<x)oo<
Taiwan x)o<X)o< )oo<x)o<
15
DOCUTi/EI,{T 1435
87. Short- and medium-term strategy consists
of building on the capabilities shown in the above
table, in approving them and in introducing fur-
ther new capabilities. Thuso the Department of
Defence considers that the fust element of its plan
for international co-ordination should include sta-
tement of all existing early-warning capabilities
and the existing planned and possible future
means of sharing information on these systems.
To summarise, this would include the following:
- 
examination of space-based sensors and
the means of sharing their data;
- 
identifying ground- and sea-based sensor
capabilities for theatre surveillance (Uni-
ted States and foreign) and associated
modifications to enable improved detec-
tion and tracking of missiles;
- 
pursuing a possible modification of air-
borne surveillance systems. The United
States is at present trying to develop a
co-operative programme with NATO,
the United Kingdom and France which
already have E-3 AWACS;
- 
determination of the adequacy of exis-
ting battle management/command,
control, communications and intelli-
gence (BMC3) systems;
- 
the identification of evolutionary com-
mand and control operational concepts;
- 
the distribution of improved early-war-
ning information which could signifi-
cantly enhance the performance of
fielded TMD systems, particularly as
the TMD systems themselves are
improved;
- 
planned modification of Patriot beyond
the fielded PAC-2 with consultations
centred on allied plans to incorporate
short-term improvements for PAC-2 and
their planning for PAC-3;
- 
Hawk improvements and the intent of
some of the nations that currently deploy
improved Hawk to upgrade their systems
with the improvements planned by the
United States marine corps;
- 
upgrades will be made to the Aegis
combat system, to support detection,
tracking and engagement of theatre bal-
listic missiles using the SM-2 Block
IVA missile;
- 
Aegis standard missile Block IVA or an
indigenous missile incorporating similar
TBMD capabilities.
88. The long-term plan will be based on the
achievements of the short- and medium-term plan
with the objective of further enhancing lower tier
capabilities and adding the upper tier capability
necessary to account for advanced theatre mis-
siles for both (a) defence-in-depth of military
forces nd (b) territorial theatre defence.
89. In the Department of Defence's view, the
earlier allied nations and friends become involved
in the programme, the better the opportunities for
co-operation. When discussions are held early in
the development of a prograurme, the opportuni-
ties for joint development and production are
greater. Participation later in the programme may
be restricted to licence production, purchase of a
system or development of a system variant with
the addition of allied technology.
90. At the present time, the United States Corps
SAM programme is in the concept definition
phase, providing, according to the American
authorities, an opportunity for international parti-
cipation. It is possible during this phase to har-
monise allied and United States requirements,
define responsibilities and contributions and
negotiate the terms and conditions of requisite
international agreements.
91. Conversely, the THAAD (theatre high-alti-
tude area defence) high-priority progralnme, now
in its demonstration and validation phase, for the
time being offers little opportunity for foreign
involvement. Although limited participation
might be possible, it would not be possible to
accommodate intemrptions for negotiations or
modifications to the prime confract.
92. Foreign participation would be possible at
and beyond the engineering and manufacturing
development stage. [n short, the Department of
Defence considers that initiating early discussions
on co-operation enables both sides to reduce
costs, avoid a duplication of effort and improve
operational concepts. In its view, such discussions
would not be detimental to established plans for
improving capabilities in the force structure as
quickly as possible.
93. The present position is that activities with
allies have tended to move from research and
development towards development and procure-
ment prograrnmes.
94. Since 1985, there has been allied partici-
pation in technical co-operation in research and
development programmes. Memorandums of
understanding were signed at the time between
the United States and Germany, Italy, Israel,
Japan and the United Kingdom for strategic
defence initiative research. In addition, memo-
randums of agreement were signed with France,
the Netherlands and the SHAPE technical
centre.
95. The table hereafter shows total foreign par-
ticipation since the beginning of the programme.
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Foreign parxicipation
340 ContractsDlnmil Total Fundlng (ll.S. / Forelgn) $1011.89 Mllllon
96. The next table shows the major co- | which refer to research and development acti-
operative programmes with allies; all of I vities.
Tenm4
Major cost sltoru co-operation arrangen efiB wilh allics
Country Programme Total value$ million
United States/
ally tunding
(approximate)
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Tsrael. . .
Data fusion
2fltghttest series
Extended air defence test bed
Artificial intelli gence
Arrow experiment
Arrow ennfi nu afi on exnerimenf f A(-FS)
26.00
65.0
t9.20
3.50
158.00
322.00
3.15
33.00
5.20
6.00
4.06
5.7
6.50
17.25
32.30
.68
42Vol58Vo
59Vol4tVo
58Vol42Vo
\Oclol20%o
80Vol20%o
72Vol287o
75%ol25%o
72%ol28Vo
80Vol20Vo
5OVol5OVo
75%ol25%o
757ol25vo
90Vollo7o
3oc/ol1DVo
59Vol4lVo
35Vo/65Vo
Tsrael
Isreel System engineering and integration
Theafte missile defence (TMD) test bed
TMD test bed enhancement
TMT) fest hed exnerimerf nrosramme
Israel
lsrael
Tsrcel
Isrqel ff vnervelnnifv larrncher
fsrcel Boost phase intercept (BPI)
Free electron laser (FEL) MOA
Hypervelocity gun test
EADTB
EADSIM
France.....
Netherlands
SHAPE
France
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97. Since 1985, the United Kingdom and the
United States have co-operated on BMD research
experiments, flight trials and information
exchanges under an overarching memorandum of
understanding. This co-operation is at both
government and industry level.
98. The United Kingdom Government is now
about to proceed with a study to determine natio-
nal BMD requirements including TMD for pro-
tection of its military forces deployed abroad.
99. The United States Departrnent of Defence
will work closely with the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence to ensure "that the govern-
ment modalities associated with possible co-ope-
ration on or direct sales of United States TMD
systems are properly reflected in their study
result... American contractors will be invited to
support British industry as part of the United
Kingdom sfragegy effort. Their requirements will
necessarily include area defences".
100. Co-operation between the United States
and Germany in anti-missile programmes began
with the implentation of the United States-Ger-
man Roland Patriot agreement in 1984. Current-
ly, the Gemran and United States Defence Minis-
tries are working together to ensure harmo-
nisation of requirements between the German
TLVS (tactical air defence system) prograrnme
and the American Corps SAM. BMDO and the
army will also work closely with the German
Minisnry of Defence with respect to their plan for
the incorporation of PAC-3 with their existing
systems.
101. France, in concert with Italy, has an
ongoing effort to develop an improved air defence
system with a TMD capability based on the future
surface-to-air family of missiles. This system will
use the Aster missile and Arabel and Empar
radars.
lO2. Earlier this year, France and Italy suggested
adata exchange agreement with the United States
to facilitate improved operability with Corps
SAM. France is also studying the possibility of
developing an upper tier TMD system.
103. France's defence white paper accords grea-
ter importance to BMD. Accordingly, the French
have embarked on a five-year BMD technology
prograrnme which provides for the possibility of
co-operation with other countries.
lM. At the beginning of this chapter, reference
was made to the extended air defence/theatre
defence ad hoc Working Group established by the
NATO Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors. The group is composed of interested nations
with resources to contribute to TMD and its aim is
to exchange views on the tactical ballistic missile
threat to the alliance and to define future methods
of collaborating in TMD.
105. Topics under discussion at present include
early warning, BMC3 (battle management, com-
mand, conftol, communications), lethality, ffia-
red plume phenomenology, Hawk upgrades and
upgrades to existing air defence systems such as
putting an infrared search and track sensor on
AWACS aircraft.
VI. Opportunities for co-operatian
106. When we speak of co-operation this
should, in our view, cover development and pro-
duction as pursued in Europe between Europeans.
Europe should adopt a definite position towards
such co-operation if it wishes it to be genuinely
profitable for the continent and to bring all part-
ners together on an equal footing.
lO7. The various systems set out hereafter might
give rise to intra-European co-operation and co-
operation between Europe and the United States.
(i) Early warning system.s
An early warning system might be imple-
mented at European level under the aus-
pices of WEU or for its use. The system
might thus include a European early war-
ning and data communication network,
interoperable with American systems.
(ii) Endo-atmosphertc systems
As we have already seen, international dis-
cussions are now being held on three-way
co-operation between the United Stateso
Germany and France which would allow
co-ordination of the SAMP/T, TLVS and
Corps SAM programmes or even the joint
development of a single prograrnme, inter-
national Corps SAM.
(iii) Endo-exo-atmospheric systems
Given that the development of THAAD is
already very far advanced in the United
States, collaboration in this area is hardly
feasible. Europe might envisage purchasing
systems from the United States although
this transaction might not cover the early
warning or command systems.
(iv ) Exo-atmospheric systems
In this area co-operation may be envisaged
between European countries and possibly
with the United States. This would involve
the installation of an interceptor system
against strategic missiles directed against
Europe. Without dismissing the possibility
of American participation, it might reaso-
nably be thought that co-operation between
Europeans might prove adequate and satis-
factory.
18
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(v) Airborne systems
In this instance also, collaboration with our
transatlantic allies is possible, with a view
to developing a missile and airborne optical
sensors adapted to European Rafale and
Eurofighter aircraft.
108. In short, it should be stressed that WEU
should first stimulate a debate on a European
early warning system to follow up the studies
which have already been started on developing a
European space-based observation system; this
European early warning system, which would
naturally be implemented through co-operation,
should be followed by another system of exo-
atmospheric and airborne defence corresponding
to agreed priorities, either for protecting Europe
itself or its troops in-theatre.
109. The success or failure of our action in the
face of this challenge will no doubt depend on the
achievement of the foregoing through European
and/or transatlantic co-operation.
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APPENDD( tr
TanI-s 1-2
Fandamental Missions of Strategb Detense
TesLE 2-l
Phase 1 System Concepts
Enlnnce Deterrenre
- 
Deny Soviet confidence in ability to plan or execute a successful aftack
- 
Influence Soviet correlation of forces
Limit Damage to the U.5., its Forces anl its Allies
- 
Protect U.S. assets from Soviet attack
- 
Preserve U.S. ability to sustain and support its allies
- 
Defeat limited or unauthorized attacks
Deny Soviet War Aims
- 
Deny "maintain continuity of CPSU control"
- 
Deny "defeat and occupy NAIO"
- 
Deny "neuffalize the United States"
- 
Deny "dominate the postwar world'o
Systern element Function
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System
(BSTS) - 
Detection of missile launches
- 
Acquisition and tracking of boosters
and PBVs
- 
Kill assessment
Space-Based Surveillance and Track-
ing System (SSTS) - 
Acquire and track PBVs, RVs, and
ASATs
- 
Discrimination
Ground-Based Surveillance and Track-
ing System (GSTS) - 
Acquisition
- 
Tracking
- 
Discrimination
Space-Based Interceptor (SBI)
- 
Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs and
ASATs
- 
Sensors on carrier vehicle (CV) could
provide enhanced mid course sensor
capability
Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Inter-
ceptor System (ERIS) - 
Disabling of RVs in late midcourse
Battle ManagemenUCommand and Con-
trol, and Communications (BIWC3) - 
Man-in-the-loop control
- 
Engagement management
- 
Maintaining track data
- 
Target assignment
- 
Communications
2t
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Tesw2-2
F ollaw-on Sy ste m C onc epts
System elements Functions
Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam
(I\rPB) Weapon - 
Interactive discrimination
- 
Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs
and ASATs
High-Endoatmospheric Defense Inter-
ceptor GGDI) - 
Disabling of RVs after reentry
Airborne Optical System (AOS)
- 
Midcourse and terminal acquisition
and racking
Ground-Based Radar (GBR)*
- 
Terminal acquisition and tracking
- 
Discrimination
Space-Based Laser (SBL)
- 
Disabling of boosters and ASATs
- 
Interactive discrimination
Ground-Based Hypervelocity Gun (HVG)
- 
Disabling RVs in terminal phase
Ground-Based Laser (GBL)
- 
Disabling of boosters
* GBR is being considered as an option for Phase I
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Missile Defense Act of 1991
Goal
. Deploy an ABM system, including one or an adequate additional number of ABM sites and space-based
sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the US against limited attacks of bal-
listic missiles.
. Maintain strategic stability.
. Provide highly effective theater missile defenses to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of US
forces and to US friends and altes.
Initial Deployment ( INMD )
. Develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology, or by
FY 96, a cost effective, operationally effective, and ABM treaty compliant ABM system at a single site
as the initial step toward deployment of the ABM system described in the 1991 Missile Defense Act
- 100 ground-based interceptors (the design of which will be deterrrined by competition and down
selection)
- fixed, ground-based ABM battle management radars
- optimum utilization of space sensors including sensors capable of cueing ground-based ABM inter-
ceptors and providing initial targeting vectors.
Lirnited Defense System (NMD)
. Development of systems, components and architectures for a deployable ABM system capable of pro-
viding a highly effective defense of the US against limited strikes, but below a threshold that would
bring into question strategic stability
- includes activities necessary to develop and test systems, components, and architectures capable of
deployment by FY 96 as part of an ABM treaty compliant initial site defense system
- for purposes of planning, evaluation, design, and effectiveness studies, such programs, projects and
activities may take into consideration both the current limitations of the ABM treaty and modest
changes to its numerical limitations and its limitations on the use of space-based sensors.
Theater Missile Defenses (TMD)
. Aggressively pursue the development of advanced theater missle defense systems with the objective of
down selecting and deploying such systems by the mid-1990s.
. Capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United
States.
. Cooperation with friendly and allied nations in the development of theater defenses against tactical or
theater ballistic missiles.
ABM Treaty Ne gotiations
. Congress recognizes the president's call for "immediate" concrete steps to permit the deployment of
defenses against limited ballistic missile strikes and the Soviets undertaking to consider such proposals
from the US on non-nuclear ABM systems.
. Congress urges the president to pursue immediate discussions with the Soviets on the feasibility and
mutual interests of amendments to the ABM treaty to permit
- additional ground sites and interceptors
- increased use of space sensors for BIWC3
- clarification of development and testing
- flexibility for advanced ABM technology.
DocuMENr 1435 APPENDX M
Space-based Interceptors ( GMD)
. Conduct research on space-based kinetic-kill interceptors and associated sensors that could provide an
overlay to ground-based ABM interceptors.
. Robust funding for research and development, for follow-on technologies, including Brilliant Pebbles,
is required.
. Deployment of Brilliant Pebbles is not included in the initial plan for the limited defense system archi-
tecture.
. Report-.on gonggptual and burden sharing issues associated with deploying space-based interceptors(including Brilliant Pebbles) for the purpose of providing global defenses against ballistic missile
attacks.
Review of Deployment Options Deployment Plan
. Interim report due May 94 on progress of nego- . Within 180 days, submit deployment Plan fortiations. TMD systems and the ABM system established
. Assess progress and consider options to the US by the goals of the 1991 missile defense act'
as now exist under the ABM featy.
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